{"id":768,"date":"2023-01-18T13:34:53","date_gmt":"2023-01-18T12:34:53","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/pworldrworld.com\/fred\/?page_id=768"},"modified":"2023-01-21T14:17:30","modified_gmt":"2023-01-21T13:17:30","slug":"notes-on-videos-about-theories-of-seeing","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/pworldrworld.com\/fred\/?page_id=768","title":{"rendered":"Notes on videos about theories of seeing"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The first video<\/strong> calls the notion of an “external” world into question. While this use of language is so familiar as to appear rock solid, it is not obligatory. The term “external world” (Au\u00dfenwelt) was introduced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This innovation was not, originally, solely about epistemology. A detailed discussion of what he meant is available here: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gottlieb, Gabriel (2015). Fichte\u2019s Deduction of the External World. International Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):217-234.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The sensorimotor correspondence theory of visual perception was introduced in 2001 by Kevin O’Regan and Alva No\u00eb. It got no more than a passing reference here, and it remains to be integrated with other relational approaches to perception, but it clearly belongs with them, and not with imagistic constructions<\/p>\n\n\n\n

O’Regan, J. K., & No\u00eb, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and brain sciences<\/em>, 24<\/em>(5), 939-973.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I would love to be able to suggest a way to get beyond thinking of the “visual field”. I suggest the term “manifestation”, but there is no established way of shifting this conversation in that direction(yet).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Video 3<\/strong>, I refer to the distinction between “wild seeing” and “aesthetic seeing” which was made by Alva No\u00eb in this book:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No\u00eb, A. (2015). Strange tools: Art and human nature<\/em>. Hill and Wang.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A video documenting the creation of the chalk drawing by Edgar Mueller can be seen here: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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